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• The introduction of the Large Value
Transfer System in February 1999, fixed
announcement dates in December 2000, and
changes in funding and collateral
management practices have had an
important effect on the structure and
dynamics of the overnight market.
• Between2001and2005,therewasgenerally
little difference between the overnight rate
on collateralized overnight funding
transactions and the target overnight rate
set by the Bank of Canada. Beginning in
early 2005, however, the rate on
collateralized funding (repo transactions)
began to drift more consistently below the
target for the overnight rate.
• The increased demand for collateral has
altered the behaviour and decision-making
process of participants in the overnight
market. Optimizing the use of collateral has
become an increasingly important
consideration among participants in
forming their overnight funding strategies.
• A signiﬁcant development in the overnight
market has been the introduction of a new
product, the overnight index swap (OIS)
market in 1999. OIS instruments are used
by participants to hedge or speculate and to
gauge future expectations in the overnight
market and have contributed to the
improved informational efﬁciency of the
market.
ajor financial market participants in
Canada with a temporary surplus or
shortage of funds use the overnight market
to lend or borrow among themselves until
the next business day. The interest rate at which these
transactions occur is referred to as the overnight rate,
and it is through its inﬂuence on the level of this rate
that the Bank of Canada implements monetary policy.
This is done by setting a target level for the over-
night rate, often referred to as the Bank’s key interest
rate or policy rate. As part of the transmission mecha-
nism for monetary policy, changes in the target over-
night rate inﬂuence other interest rates and the
exchange rate, leading to changes in asset prices,
aggregate demand, the output gap, and eventually,
inflation.1 As a result, the efficiency of the overnight
market is of particular interest to the Bank of Canada.
This article provides an overview of the current
structure of the Canadian overnight market and
describes how it has evolved since the Bank last pub-
lished a review of this market in 1997.2 Among other
developments, the introduction of the Large Value
Transfer System (LVTS) in February 1999, the adoption
of fixed announcement dates (FADs) in December 2000,
and changes in funding and collateral management
practices have had an important effect on the structure
and dynamics of the overnight market. As a result,
this market has shifted from being mainly a source of
1. See Macklem (2002) for a description of how monetary policy is formulated.
2.   See Lundrigan and Toll (1997–98) for details of that review.
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funding to one where collateral management has
become an important consideration.
Market Overview
Theovernightmarketbringstogetherﬁnancialmarket
participants with temporary surplus funds and those
that are potential borrowers. Participants include a
broad array of financial entities: banks, investment deal-
ers,interdealerbrokers,corporations,investmentfunds
(including hedge funds), pension funds, insurance
companies, trust companies, ﬁnance companies, gov-
ernment agencies, and the Government of Canada.3
Over the past decade, the range of participants has
not changed dramatically. However, their relative
importance has changed somewhat, with institutional
investors in general playing a modestly larger role in
this market.
Commercial banks and investment dealers remain
the largest borrowers and lenders of funds in the over-
night market, primarily because of their market-
making activities in a wide variety of financial
assets (e.g., stocks and bonds), which require them
to hold inventories of financial securities ﬁnanced
largely by borrowing in the overnight market. Other
participants, such as asset managers (including man-
agers of hedge funds) and sophisticated investors,
also use the overnight market to ﬁnance their market
positions, but to a lesser extent.
Financial institutions are the main providers of
liquidity in the overnight market and are usually
willing to provide quotes for both borrowing and
lending overnight funds to their clients and other
ﬁnancial institutions.
Financial instruments in the overnight
market
While banks are active participants in the market for
overnight funds, most of their funding needs, including
the funding of their overall operations, are still met
through wholesale deposits. These deposits continue
to make up the largest proportion of overnight trans-
actions, followed by collateralized transactions and
uncollateralized transactions.4 Wholesale deposits
provide banks with a stable source of funding and are
consistent with maintaining strong client relationships.
As a result, deposit-taking institutions provide their
3. A signiﬁcant amount of the information in this article was gathered during
consultations between the Bank and market participants in April and May
2006.
4.   Technically, commercial banks borrow wholesale deposits on an uncollat-
eralized basis.
clients with daily bid and offer rates for overnight
funding, adjusted slightly to account for the institution’s
preference to be a net lender or borrower of funds on
that day. The functioning of this segment of the market
has not changed materially over the past decade.5
However, quotes in the wholesale deposit market are
now based on the Bank of Canada’s target overnight
rate (introduced in 1999), which has helped to improve
the level of price transparency in this segment of the
market.
Quotes in the wholesale deposit
market are based on the Bank of
Canada’s target overnight rate, which
has helped to improve the level of
price transparency in this segment of
the overnight market.
The repo market is by far the largest component of the
collateralized segment of the overnight market and
is of particular importance, owing to its high level of
transparency relative to other segments of the market.
Repo and reverse-repo transactions are also an impor-
tant component of banks’ funding and are the main
funding vehicles for ﬁrms that do not have access to
deposits (e.g., securities dealers). A repo combines
both an immediate sale of securities and a simultaneous
agreement to repurchase these securities at a pre-spec-
ified price and date (usually the next day). The opposite
transaction is known as a reverse repo.6 From an
economic standpoint, a reverse repo can be likened to
a collateralized loan, where one party loans funds to
another and in return receives collateral in the form of
acceptable securities as insurance that the loan will be
repaid. In Canada, from a legal standpoint, repos and
reverse-repo transactions are actually buy/sellback
agreements. This implies that the securities are
bought and resold at different prices to reﬂect both the
interest on the implicit cash loan and any cash ﬂows
that occur over the term of the agreement. Other
components of the collateralized segment of the
overnight market, such as call loans, once the primary
5.   See Lundrigan and Toll (1997–98) for greater detail on the wholesale
deposit market.
6.   See Morrow (1994–95).17 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
source of financing for investment dealers, have
gradually decreased in importance.
Most of the collateral used in the Canadian overnight
market consists of Government of Canada marketable
debt. The repo market does not usually differentiate
between specific Government of Canada securities,
collectively referring to them as “general collateral”
or the GC repo market. If, however, a security is in
particular demand (Government of Canada or other-
wise), perhaps because of a speciﬁc trading strategy
prevalent in the broader market, it can trade at a lower
rate7 in the repo market and is referred to as being on
“special.” Specials markets are common in most major
overnight repo markets, including those in the United
States and the United Kingdom, and increasingly in
the Canadian market.
The use of alternative sources of collateral, including
provincial and government-guaranteed securities, has
increased somewhat but has yet to become an active
component of the Canadian repo market. This may
be partly because these products are not perfect sub-
stitutes for Government of Canada collateral, given
their slightly lower credit quality. The use of other
forms of collateral, such as corporate or municipal
bonds, presents an additional hurdle. Specifically, a
bank that uses these products as collateral must put
7.   Since securities in high demand will trade at a lower rate in the repo mar-
ket, participants who own such securities can lend them in the repo market in
return for cash on which they pay a lower interest rate than that available in
the GC repo market.
aside additional capital in accordance with the capital-
adequacy requirements laid out by the Ofﬁce of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI).
The interbank market in Canada, in which financial
institutions borrow from and lend to each other without
the borrower posting collateral, is small and continues
to decline as a fraction of the overall overnight mar-
ket. This contrasts with the United States, where the
interbank market is deep and broadly based and the tar-
geted policy rate, the federal funds rate, is in fact an
interbank rate. The interbank market in Canada is
currently used primarily by smaller financial institu-
tions without a broad domestic deposit base. It is also
used among direct participants in the LVTS, not as a
significant source of funding, but for end-of-day
adjustment transactions. Depending on the institution,
foreign exchange swaps8 will also be of varying impor-
tance in achieving day-to-day funding requirements.
A significant recent development in the overnight
market has been the introduction of a new product,
the overnight index swap (OIS) market in 1999. OIS
instruments are used by participants to hedge or
speculate and to gauge future expectations in the
overnight market and have improved the market’s
8.   These are the sale (purchase) of foreign currency on a given date with a
matching purchase (sale) arranged for a future date, for the same amount,
with the same counterparty. Fully hedged borrowing (lending), called north-
bound (southbound), involves borrowing (lending) U.S. dollars and entering
into foreign exchange swaps in which Canadian dollars are purchased (sold)
for settlement today with an agreement to sell (buy) them for settlement at the
end of the borrowing period.
Box 1: The Overnight Index Swap Market
An overnight index swap (OIS) is an over-the-
counter derivative1 in which two parties agree to
exchange, or swap, for an agreed period, a fixed
interest rate determined at the time of the trade
for a ﬂoating rate that will vary over time. In this
regard, OIS contracts are similar to traditional
fixed-floating interest rate swaps. The distinguishing
feature of the OIS is that the floating rate is the
Canadian Overnight Repo RateAverage(CORRA)
over the period.
Market participants predominantly use the OIS
market for hedging activities, which are often
1.   Over-the-counter trades occur directly between participants and not
through a centralized exchange.
related to risk management. Speciﬁcally, partici-
pants can use the OIS to hedge either their funding
costs or their exposure to short-term interest rate
movements. The OIS market can also be used to
alter the term structure of a portfolio or fortaking
a speculative position on the future path of the Bank
of Canada’s target overnight rate.
Related to the speculative and hedging functions of
the OIS, the ﬁxed-rate portion is also used by some
market participants to derive market expectations
of the Bank’s future policy rate changes. If the
duration of the swap extends over a FAD, for exam-
ple, the difference between the ﬁxed rate and the
current overnight rate can be used to calculate the
market expectations of a future change in policy18 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
Box 1: The Overnight Index Swap Market (cont’d)
rates. The OIS has several advantages over other
money market instruments in calculating expecta-
tions. Unlike other financial instruments, it is
directly linked to the Canadian overnight rate.
Furthermore, given that they are derivatives instru-
ments, the supply of OIS contracts is not ﬁxed. Sup-
ply factors can occasionally inﬂuence the pricing of
other instruments, such as bankers’ acceptances
(BAs). The use of the OIS market to gauge expecta-
tions also presents some challenges. At times there
is a lack of price information or market depth in the
OIS market, particularly in farther-dated contracts.
Moreover, if the CORRA rate were expected to devi-
ate from the overnight target, gauging expectations
of future interest rates would become more difficult.
Market development
The Canadian OIS market has grown rapidly since
it was introduced in March 1999. Although it is dif-
ficult to determine the market’s exact size, anec-
dotal evidence and information obtained from
dealers suggest that the notional principal amount
outstanding is between $40 billion and $100 billion.2
This compares reasonably well with other money
market instruments, such as BAs and Government
of Canada treasury bills, which have outstanding
amounts of around $55 billion and $130 billion,
respectively. The most active and liquid money
market instruments, however, remain futures
contracts on BAs, which have an open interest of
around $475 billion.
Several factors have contributed to the growth of
the OIS market, including both the adoption of the
FADs by the Bank of Canada and improvements to
the publishing of the CORRA.3 The relative stability
and predictability of the CORRA and the off-bal-
ance-sheet nature of an OIS transaction,4 as well as
the ﬂexibility of its term to maturity, have also
helped to attract interest from market participants.
2. Information used to estimate market size was collected through visits
with dealers during the autumn of 2005.
3.   These include greater precision (moving from two decimals to four),
reﬁning the window in which trades are recorded (06:00 to 16:00), and
publishing the CORRA earlier, at 09:00 rather than noon on the next busi-
ness day.
4.   Notional amounts do not appear in the main body of the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial statements.
Since there is no transfer of principal between
counterparties, another advantage of the OIS is
that there is relatively little credit risk. Interest rate
swaps, including the OIS, do not involve the partic-
ipants in the exchange of principal. The only transfer
of funds occurs at the maturity of the contract and
reﬂects the net obligation of one party to the other.
The net obligation is the difference between the
interest accrued on the fixed (OIS) rate and the
compoundedfloatingrateoverthetermoftheswap.5
Market overview
The terms to maturity for OIS typically range from
one week to one year, with the majority of trading
and quotes concentrated in relatively short and
standardized maturities of three months or less.
The bid/ask spreads for OIS were originally as wide
as ﬁve basis points (bps), but are now typically one
to two bps for swaps of three months or less and
slightly wider for longer-term swaps.6 Like those
for other money market instruments, the spreads
can vary from day to day, depending on market
conditions. The more common factors that affect
spreads include the predictability and consistency
of the CORRA and the relative level of uncertainty
about future changes in the target overnight rate by
the Bank of Canada.
The standard quote sizes for an OIS tend to be
between $25 million and $125 million, with the
$125 million applying to contracts up to six months
and the $25 million applying to longer contracts.
However, actual transactions tend to be for amounts
significantly largerthan the standardquotes. Market
depth has tended to be quite good in recent years,
and it is not uncommon to see transactions for over
$1 billion in the 1-month area and several hundred
million dollars for other swap terms on a daily basis.
5.   Swaps, including the OIS, are based on an agreed notional amount.
6.   Usually the spread compresses quite signiﬁcantly before a trade is
completed, declining from approximately two bps to as little as one-quar-
ter of a basis point.19 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
partly because the average money market ﬁnancing
rate represents a signiﬁcantly greater volume of over-
night transactions from a broader set of participants.
A portion of repo and reverse-repo transactions are
visible to most wholesale market participants on various
interdealer broker screens (both the size of the trade
and the rate at which it was transacted). However,
since most transactions (repo and otherwise) in the
overnight market are conducted directly between
counterparties, not through brokers, the true level
of activity in the overnight repo market is not easily
discernible by participants. Quarterly trading statistics
provided to the Bank and the Investment Dealers
Association by government securities distributors
suggestthatthevolumeofCanadianrepotransactions
involving Government of Canada marketable debt
is approximately Can$55 billion a day. The daily
volume has grown considerably since 1994–95 when
the Bank first reviewed the Canadian repo market
(Morrow 1994–95). As can be seen in Chart 2, however,
weekly repo volume peaked in 1997–98 and then
remained relatively stable, albeit at a modestly lower
level, between 1999 and 2005. Recently, repo volumes
in Canada have increased and are approaching their
highest recorded levels.
Despite the prevalence of direct bilateral transactions,
market participants in general believe that the quotes
postedbyinterdealerbrokersforGovernmentofCanada
securities accurately reﬂect the price in the broader
over-the-counter(OTC)overnightmarketatanygiven
Chart 1
The Money Market Financing Rate and the




























* Both rates are shown minus the target for the overnight rate.
informational efﬁciency. The OIS market is discussed
in greater detail in Box 1.
Overall, most of the assets that are funded in the over-
night market continue to be denominated in Canadian
dollars. Therefore, despite the globalization of capital
markets,mostoftheovernightfundingrequirementsof
Canadian financial participants continue to be met
through Canadian-dollar-denominated overnight
financial instruments.
Market transparency and ﬂows
Given the myriad of funding products available in
the overnight market, the Bank of Canada uses two
measures of the collateralized overnight rate as proxies
for the overall average cost of overnight funding.
The two measures, which the Bank publishes, are the
Canadian Overnight Repo Rate Average (CORRA)
and the overnight money market ﬁnancing rate. The
CORRA consists of a weighted average of rates on
repo transactions conducted onscreen between 06:00
and 16:00 and subsequently reported by interdealer
brokers. The CORRA is limited to repo transactions
that involve general collateral (GC) and provides a
transparent intraday and end-of-day measure of the
level of the overnight rate.
The Bank of Canada uses two
measures of the collateralized
overnight rate as proxies for the
overall average cost of overnight
funding.
The overnight money market ﬁnancing rate is an esti-
mate compiled at the end of the day by the Bank of
Canada through a survey of major participants in the
overnight market. This estimate, which comprises the
weighted-average repo funding cost of major money
market dealers, including special purchase and resale
agreements (SPRAs)9 with the Bank of Canada and
trades that are conducted directly between dealers,
provides a somewhat broader measure than the
CORRA. The overnight money market ﬁnancing rate
observed in Chart 1 is less volatile than the CORRA,
9. SPRAs and SRAs are repo-type and reverse repo-type transactions, respec-
tively, in which the Bank offers to purchase (sell) Government of Canada
securities from designated counterparties with an agreement to sell (buy)
them back at a predetermined price on the next business day.20 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
time. The interdealer broker screens therefore pro-
vide a primary source of price discovery throughout
the day. In addition, at the end of the day, when most
participants are ﬁne-tuning their funding positions,
the interdealer broker screens are also used as a way
to ﬁnd counterparties with offsetting positions.
While the repo transactions conducted through the
interdealer brokers provide some transparency, the
volume of transactions conducted in that segment
of the market has, on occasion, been very low. Since
Chart 2





















1999, there have been 145 instances where the daily
volume of GC repo transactions conducted through
interdealer brokers was below $500 million, the
minimum threshold for setting the CORRA since
December 2005. When the volume of daily repo
transactions recorded by the interdealer brokers is
below $500 million, the CORRA is simply set as the
target overnight rate, which may or may not accurately
reflect the true rate of collateralized funding. Overall,
however, the volume of repo transactions conducted
through interdealer brokers has increased since 1999,
and this has helped to improve the transparency of
the overnight market.10
In the uncollateralized portion of the market, interbank
quotes are also visible on interdealer broker screens,
but market depth remains limited. In addition, while
rates on wholesale deposits are not visible to the market
as a whole, rates quoted to customers are set relative
to the target overnight rate. The improvements to
the monetary policy framework, including the explicit
communication of the target overnight rate, have thus
provided some level of transparency to wholesale
deposit clients.
Another measure of the uncollateralized portion of
the market as proposed by Hendry and Kamhi (2007)
can be obtained from the overnight loan and loan
repayment transactions that occur through the LVTS
(Box 2).
10.   Speciﬁcally, in 2006, there were only four instances when the daily vol-
ume fell below the minimum threshold.
Box 2: An Alternative Measure of the Uncollateralized Portion of the
Overnight Market
Hendry and Kamhi (2007) derive an estimate of the
uncollateralized portion of the overnight market
for the two-year period starting March 2004 by
analyzing the transactions ﬂows in Canada’s LVTS.
Adapting a methodology developed in the United
States for imputing federal funds transactions from
Fedwire activity,1 the authors estimate that about
US$5 billion of uncollateralized overnight loans are
1. Fedwire is a real-time gross-settlement system operated by the Federal
Reserve that enables participating ﬁnancial institutions to electronically
transfer funds among themselves. In conjunction with the privately held
Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), Fedwire forms the
primary network for large-value domestic and international payments in
the United States.
transacted daily. This figure represents a lower
bound estimate of the uncollateralized market,
given that certain overnight loans do not lead to
LVTS payments. As such, the uncollateralized mar-
ket is slightly larger than the brokered repo mar-
ket, but only about one-tenth the size of the
direct-trade repo market. The implied overnight
interest rate on these loans displayed little variation
from the target overnight rate, with a mean spread
of only 0.017 basis points. This implied interest rate
was found to vary with general market conditions,
the size of the loan, and the size of the borrower
and lender. The data also revealed that, as expected,
smaller LVTS participants are, in general, a net
source of funds to the larger banks.21 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
Structural Change and the
Collateralized Overnight Rate
The Canadian overnight market has continued to
evolve since its inception. The past 10 years have
witnessed exceptional change, including the introduction
of the LVTS and the FADs, changes in market prac-
tices regarding risk management, the rise of securities
lending, and the growing importance of the collateral-
ized portion of the overnight market.
The LVTS
In Canada, the implementation of monetary policy is
closely linked to the system through which payments
clear and settle on a daily basis. The LVTS, an electronic
network for sending and receiving large payments,
was introduced by the Canadian Payments Association
on 4 February 1999. The system allows for LVTS direct
participants to settle their large payment obligations
both among themselves and for their clients. To mini-
mize the risk of one of the participants failing to meet
its obligations, members are required to post collat-
eral to support their payment flows. All direct LVTS
participants hold settlement accounts at the Bank of
Canada.
Earlier, in 1994, the Bank had started to direct its policy
actions towards maintaining the overnight rate at a level
within a 50-basis-point operating band that was con-
sistent with its objective for overall monetary conditions.
The Bank offered SRAs and SPRAs as a mechanism to
set the limits of the band. With the introduction of
the LVTS, the Bank made various modifications to
the framework for the implementation of monetary
policy (Howard 1998). The Bank formally set the target
overnight rate as the midpoint of the 50-basis-point
operating band and reinforced the latter with its end-
of-day deposit and lending facility. The upper limit of
the band, known as the Bank Rate, became the rate
charged to LVTS participants that require an overdraft
loan to cover a deﬁcit position and permit LVTS settle-
ment at the end of the day. The lower limit of the band
became the rate at which the Bank of Canada remuner-
ates LVTS participants holding deposits at the end of
each day’s LVTS settlement.11 This mechanism greatly
reduces the probability that the overnight rate will
trade outside of the band.
11.   Both the upper and lower limits of the band are generally thought of as
collateralized rates. Technically, however, the Bank does not pledge collateral
when it borrows funds at the lower limit, since it poses no counterparty risk.
LVTS participants do provide collateral when they take advances from the
Bank of Canada.
Given the cost incentives in the LVTS, it is mutually
beneﬁcial for participants with short and long funding
positions to trade with each other, rather than to leave
those positions with the Bank. Furthermore, the
symmetry of the operating band creates incentives
for LVTS participants to transact at or near the target
overnight rate. The Bank also continues to intervene
intraday in the overnight market with SPRAs and SRAs,
as needed, to reinforce the midpoint as the target over-
night rate.
The symmetry of the operating band
creates incentives for LVTS
participants to transact at or near the
target overnight rate.
Assuming that no excess balances are left in the sys-
tem, the aggregate position of all LVTS members with
settlement accounts at the Bank will be zero at the
end of the day. Members with a deﬁcit balance will
thus be aware that an offsetting positive position exists
in the account of one or more other members. While
the LVTS framework can operate with zero settlement
balances, the Bank has often left a small positive amount
of settlement balances to offset transactions costs and
other minor market structure frictions (see “Evolution of
the Overnight Rate and the Demand for Collateral,”
below).
Not all financial market participants are LVTS members.
As of December 2006, excluding the Bank of Canada,
there were 14 direct members of the LVTS. However,
since direct LVTS participants transact with their
customers, including other ﬁnancial institutions and
commercial and government entities, a link is created
between the incentives within the LVTS and the broader
cost of overnight funding. Consequently, the LVTS
framework has contributed to a more predictable
overall cost of funding, thus providing a benefit to
both international and domestic investors, the Canadian
economy, and, ultimately, the welfare of all Canadians.
The evolution of the Bank of Canada’s monetary
policy framework is outlined in Table 1.
Fixed announcement dates
In December 2000, the Bank of Canada adopted a new
framework, the fixed announcement dates (FADs),
consisting of eight pre-speciﬁed dates a year on which
policy rate decisions would be announced. Before the22 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
adoption of the FADs, changes to the target overnight
rate could be announced at 09:00 on virtually any
business day. Because of the uncertainty that sur-
rounded the timing of the announcements, market
participants incorporated a risk premium in the price
that they were willing to quote their customers to bor-
row and lend funds for periods longer than one day.
The introduction of the FADs has greatly reduced this
uncertainty (Parent, Munro, and Parker 2003) and has
led to improvements in the efﬁciency of the Canadian
money market, including the development of new
ﬁnancial instruments such as the OIS (Box 1). Among
its other uses, the OIS market allows participants to
more effectively hedge their funding requirements
and/or short-term interest rate exposure.
The introduction of the FADs has
increased hedging opportunities and
encouraged the use of term repo
transactions.
The introduction of the FADs has also contributed to
changes in how transactions take place in the repo
market, with an increasing proportion of such transac-
Pre-November 1956 Bank Rate set at the discretion of the Bank of
and June 1962 to Canada
March 1980
November 1956 to Bank Rate set weekly at 25 basis points above
June 1962 and the 3-month treasury bill rate at tender
March 1980 to
February 1996
November 1991 to Operating framework changed in anticipation
June 1992 of the removal of statutory reserve requirements
June 1992 to June 1994 Phase-out of statutory reserves
Mid-1994 Introduction of 50-basis-point operating band
for the overnight rate; changes in operating band
are inferred from the Bank’s use of SPRAs /SRAs.
February 1996 Bank Rate set at upper limit of operating band;
changes in operating band announced by press
release
February 1999 Introduction of the Large Value Transfer System
December 2000 Introduction of the ﬁxed announcement dates
Table 1
Evolution of the Monetary Policy Framework
Date Change in Policy Implementation Framework
tions being conducted over longer terms (referred to
as term repos) rather than on an overnight basis.12
Instead of unwinding the next day, a growing number
of repo transactions now mature on, or close to, the
FADs. The evidence presented in Chart 3 suggests that
this shift has not materially affected daily liquidity in
the overnight repo market, perhaps because of the
growth in overall repo volumes (Chart 2). The growth
of term repo transactions has, however, reduced daily
rollover risk for ﬁnancial market participants. It also
implies that large volumes may be transacted at or
near the FADs.
Overall, however, the introduction of the FADs has
increased hedging opportunities and encouraged the
use of term repo transactions. This, in turn, has
facilitated the management of risk in the daily fund-
ing requirements of ﬁnancial market participants.
Receiver General auctions
As the government’s ﬁscal agent, the Bank of Canada
manages the government’s cash balances to ensure
it can meet its operating requirements and that any
balances in excess of daily requirements are invested
in a cost-effective manner. These excess short-term
Canadian-dollar balances are invested through daily
12.   To a lesser extent, transactions and settlement costs may have also inﬂu-
enced the shift in the term of repo transactions.
Chart 3
Daily Overnight Repo Volume Conducted through
Interdealer Brokers
30-day moving average
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auctions of Receiver General (RG) balances.13 Coinci-
dent with the introduction of the LVTS, the frequency
of RG auctions was expanded to twice daily (morning
and afternoon), and all LVTS participants became
eligible participants. In addition, the list of eligible
institutions for the morning auction was expanded in
2002 to include certain other qualifying participants.
The morning auction typically represents the bulk
of the amount auctioned and is to a large extent
collateralized. A cushion of balances is maintained
through to the afternoon to ensure sufficient balances
to meet any unexpected requirements. Once the
closing amounts are determined, the final auction is
held at 16:15. Only LVTS participants are eligible to
participate in the afternoon auctions (which are uncol-
lateralized).
Under the September 2002 revisions to the terms of
participationinRGauctions,themorninggovernment
auction of deposits to specified participants requires
the borrower to post collateral beyond a certain
threshold in the form of ﬁnancial securities such as
government bonds and bills.14 As such, the collateral-
ized portion of the morning RG auction can be likened
to a large repo transaction. Since the results of the
auction are transparent to all participants in the auc-
tion system, it stands to reason that the auction may
provide an early source of price discovery in the over-
night market.15 Nonetheless, there is little evidence
that the auctions have had a material impact on the
daily average repo rate as measured by the CORRA,
other than perhaps at times of seasonal peaks in the
level of balances. Speciﬁcally, since 2002, the spread
between the rate received by the Receiver General at
the morning auction and the target overnight rate has
shown little correlation (0.14) with the spread between
the CORRA and the target overnight rate.
Securities lenders
Improvements in the government’s fiscal position
over the past decade have led to a decline in the supply
of Government of Canada marketable debt. In theory,
13.   These daily auctions are also the mechanism for the transfer
of balances to and from the Bank of Canada’s balance sheet to those of the
private sector. The difference between the aggregate amount maturing on
any given day and the new balances auctioned typically represents the
neutralization of the net impact of any public sector ﬂows to and from
the Bank of Canada’s balance sheet.
14.   For a list of acceptable collateral, see “Terms and Conditions Governing
the Morning Auction of Receiver General Cash Balances” on the Bank’s
website at www.bankofcanada.ca/en/auction/rec_general.pdf.
15.   Results are typically released to auction participants at about 09:20.
a significant decline in available collateral could reduce
the efﬁciency of the Canadian repo market, the over-
night market, and the Canadian securities market
more broadly. However, the decline in the supply of
Government of Canada marketable debt has, to
date, been a relatively modest percentage of the total
outstanding16 and has been at least partially offset by
the growth of secrities-lending agreements.
Securities-lending agreements help to mobilize the
stock of existing securities sitting with custodians17
into active use in the collateralized portion of the
overnight market. The increase in the amount of secu-
rities being made available for overnight transactions
has been facilitated by the growth of securities-lending
agents, who act as third party to the borrowing or
lending of financial securities. Securities lending is
generally conducted by large, often global custodians
or asset managers on behalf of numerous clients. For
instance, an asset manager may hold a number of
securities in its portfolio, but for reasons of cost or
size, perhaps, may choose not to enter into the repo
market directly. In the past, those securities would
have been unavailable for use as collateral in the over-
night market. Increasingly, however, portfolio managers
are entering into agreements with securities lenders
(frequently their custodians) to allow them to act (under
certain restrictions) as a third-party agent in lending
out portions of their portfolio in return for a fee.
InCanada,thepoolofsecuritiesavailablefromsecurities
lenders has experienced strong growth over the past
decade. This may reﬂect, in part, the removal in 2001
of some restrictions on the participation of Canadian
mutual funds in securities lending and in repo and
reverse-repo transactions. While mutual funds can
now enter the overnight market directly, many may
choose, for cost or strategic efficiency reasons, to
participate indirectly through securities-lending
agreements.
Securities lending has likely been positive, on net, to
the liquidity of the Canadian fixed-income market,
but its impact on the overnight market remains some-
what difficult to gauge. Specifically, the cost to financial
participants of accessing securities via a securities
lender is higher, owing to an additional fee structure
16.   The amount of marketable Government of Canada debt fell from
$467 billion in 1997–98 to $427 billion in 2005–2006, an 8.5 per cent decline.
17.   A custodian is a ﬁnancial institution that has the legal responsibility for
safeguarding and managing a ﬁrm’s or individual's ﬁnancial assets. Custodi-
ans are required to arrange the settlement of any purchases and sales of such
securities and to collect the income from such assets on behalf of their owners.24 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
and the need to provide more collateral (in return for
the desired securities). Securities lending therefore
provides speciﬁc liquidity for securities that may be in
high demand and thus command a premium in the
repo market.18 By supplying liquidity in specific bonds
and treasury bills as well as a range of other ﬁnancial
securities, securities lending provides a net beneﬁt to
ﬁnancial markets more broadly. This beneﬁt is likely
mitigated,however,bythedegreetowhichGovernment
of Canada bonds and treasury bills are posted as
collateral by participants to obtain speciﬁc issues from
securities lenders, since the pool of GC is thereby tem-
porarily reduced.
Evolution of the Overnight Rate and
the Demand for Collateral
The introduction of the LVTS
The overnight rate initially exhibited some volatility
following the introduction of the LVTS in 1999, generally
trading above target (Chart 1). During this early period,
the Bank customarily set the level of settlement balances
in the system at zero. This consistent trading of the
overnight rate above target indicated, however, that
there was some demand for excess balances. Beginning
in September 1999, at month-ends, and starting in
November 1999 on a daily basis, the Bank generally
provided some positive level of settlement balances
and somewhat higher levels when technical pressures
occurred. At that time, the Bank also intervened regu-
larly in the overnight market with SPRAs to reinforce
18.   Speciﬁc securities that are in high demand by borrowers can trade in the
repo market at a rate below that of GC. Since these securities are deemed to be
trading on special, the rate at which they trade is not included in the CORRA
measure of the overnight rate.
February 1999 End-of-day settlement balances targeted at zero
September 1999 Positive balances on technically tight days
(month-ends); zero otherwise
November 1999 Minimum daily balances of $200 million,
higher on technically tight days
April 2001 $50 million most days; higher on technically
tight days (month-ends, mid-months)
March 2006 Zero target balances on a daily basis, with
possibility of deﬁcit position
Table 2
Timetable of Adjustments to Target Settlement
Balances
the target overnight rate. After this transition period,
the overnight rate became significantly more stable,
tracking the overnight target closely between 2001
and 2005. As a result, the Bank of Canada inter-
vened less frequently with SRAs and SPRAs and
gradually reduced the level of settlement balances
(Table 2).
Recent divergence between secured and
unsecured funding
Between 2001 and 2005, there was generally little
difference between the overnight rate on collateralized
overnight funding transactions and the target overnight
rate set by the Bank of Canada. Beginning in early
2005, however, the volatility of the CORRA increased
(Chart 1), and the rate on collateralized funding (repo
transactions) began to drift more consistently below
the target for the overnight rate. As a result, the frequency
with which the Bank conducted SRA operations
increased (Chart 4), and in March 2006, the Bank intro-
duced some temporary measures to reinforce the target
overnight rate. Further measures were added in
February 2007 (Box 3).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a general increase in
the demand for GC from various sources led to the
downward pressure on the collateralized overnight
rate. In a repo transaction, an increase in the value of col-
lateral would be reflected in a decrease in the repo rate;
in other words, participants wanting to obtain GC
would need to provide in return an overnight loan of
funds at lower interest rates.
Chart 4
SPRA and SRA Operations
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The Increased Demand for Collateral
Since 1997, there has been a notable increase in the
number of uses and hence in the demand for collateral.
Thisgreaterdemandstemsinlargepartfromchanges
in risk-management practices,19 greater use of financial
derivatives, and the increased need for collateral in
the major settlement and payments systems. Given
these changes, market participants have altered their
valuation and management of collateral.
Greater focus on risk management has increased the
focus on collateral management. For instance, partici-
pants increasingly differentiate between the risks
and internal capital costs of collateralized versus
uncollateralized funding. Since one loan isbacked
by collateral and the other is not, there is little reason,
from a risk-management perspective, for the rates on
the two loans to be equivalent. Overall, participants
19.   Changes in risk management were likely prompted in part by theguide-
linesfor capital-adequacy requirements provided by OSFI to deposit-taking
institutions.
are becoming more reluctant to lend in the overnight
marketonanuncollateralizedbasiswithoutappropriate
remuneration.ThistrendmayintensifyasBaselII20
is adopted and even greater emphasis is put on risk
management and internally calculated capital costs.
Participants are also putting greater emphasis at the
margin on maintaining appropriate internal liquidity
ratios, which in essence requires them to maintain
larger cushions of collateral to ensure that they are
able to raise additional funds in a timely manner, if
needed (either in the repo market or by liquidating
these positions).
In addition, collateral is increasingly used worldwide
to help mitigate the counterparty risk associated with
swap and other OTC derivative activity. As these markets
20.   Basel II is the second Basel Accord and represents a revision of the inter-
nationalstandardsformeasuringtheadequacyofabank'scapital.Theaimof
the Accord is to promote greater consistency in the way banks and banking
regulators approach risk management across countries. Implementation of
the Accord is expected in 2008.
Box 3: The Bank of Canada’s Temporary Measures to Reinforce the Target
for the Overnight Rate
InMarch2006,theBankofCanadaintroducedtem-
porarymeasurestohelpreinforcethetargetforthe
overnight rate.1 Speciﬁcally, the Bank announced
that, on a temporary basis, it would reduce settle-
ment balances to zero and no longer commit to
fully neutralizing SRA operations. That is, when
the Bank conducts an SRA, it provides collateral in
return for funds on which it pays the target over-
nightrate.Thesefundsarethenusuallyneutralized
(i.e., put back into the system at the end of the
day) through a transfer of Receiver General (RG)
balances from the Bank’s balance sheet to winning
participants in the afternoon RG auction. By not
committing to fully neutralizing these flows, the
Bankcouldinessenceleavethesystemshort,causing
one or more LVTS participants to have a deﬁcit
position at the end of the day. This short position
would then necessitate an advance from the Bank
at the Bank Rate (25 basis points above the target
overnight rate) and a pledge of collateral. Fromthe
1.  See “Temporary Measures to Reinforce the Target for the Overnight
Rate,” Thursday 9 March 2006, available on the Bank’s website at
www.bankofcanada.ca/en/notices_fmd/2006/not090306.html.
introduction of the temporary measures through to
February 2007, the system was left short 15 times.
SimilartemporarymeasuresweretakeninSeptember
1999, soon after the introduction of the LVTS, to not
commit to fully neutralize SPRA operations (as
opposed to SRAs) at month-end. As a result of
the ability to not fully neutralize SRA or SPRA
operations, the Bank provides a further incentive to
participants to conduct transactions in the over-
night market at or very close to the target overnight
rate.
In February 2007, to further reinforce the Bank’s
objective for the overnight rate, the Bank announced
that it is prepared to enter into SRAs outside of the
regular 11:45 intervention time, including earlier in
the morning.2
The Bank has subsequently clariﬁed its policy
implementationframework,detailsofwhichcanbe
found in the Appendix (p. 28).
2.  See “Temporary Measures to Reinforce the Target for the Overnight
Rate,” Thursday 15 February 2007, available on the Bank’s website at
www.bankofcanada.ca/en/notices_fmd/2007/not150207.html.26 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
continuetogrow,andmoreISDAMasterAgreements21
are put into place between counterparties, the demand
for collateral is expected to increase even more. As an
example of recent growth, the amount of collateral
pledged for OTC derivative exposure worldwide had
grown from US$200 billion in 2000 to over US$1.3
trillion by the end of 2005 (BIS 2007).
Demand for collateral has grown for other reasons as
well, including the needs pertaining to the clearing
and settlement systems (e.g., the LVTS, the Canadian
Depository for Securities Limited (CDS), and the
CLS Bank)22 and the partial collateralization of RG
term deposits. For instance, for many participants, the
collateral needs stemming from the LVTS represent
their single largest demand for collateral. Not only is
this demand for collateral new since the last pub-
lished overview of the overnight market in 1997, but
the requirements have grown, partly because of the
growth of foreign exchange settlement via the CLS
Bank.23 The average amount of collateral pledged
daily for LVTS/CDS/CLS Bank purposes increased
from about $18 billion in 2000 to $26 billion in 2006Q2.
Overall, the Bank’s measures of the overnight rate
have remained predominantly at, or close to, the target
overnight rate. However, an increase in the overall
demand for Government of Canada collateral has, at
the margin, increased the likelihood that participants
will have more difficulty finding sufficient collateral
on certain occasions. This implies that temporary
additional increases in the demand for collateral have
been more likely to result in the collateralized overnight
rate moving away from the target.
Collateral Management and Changes
in Market Behaviour
The implicit, if not explicit, increase in the value of
collateralhasalteredthebehaviouranddecision-making
processes of participants in the overnight market. The
optimal use of collateral has become an increasingly
21.   The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) is a trade
organization of participants in the OTC derivatives market. An ISDA Master
Agreement is a standardized contract (which includes collateral arrange-
ments) that two parties to an agreement sign before entering into a derivative
transaction with each other. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
reports that the number of ISDA Master Agreements worldwide increased
from 12,000 in 1998 to about 110,000 at the end of 2005 (BIS 2007).
22. Based in New York City and regulated by the Federal Reserve Board, CLS
Bank International provides “continuous linked settlement” (CLS) for foreign
exchange transactions. For more information, see Miller and Northcott (2002).
23. The Bank of Canada provides the CLS Bank with a settlement account for
the Canadian-dollar leg of the settlement and acts on its behalf in the LVTS.
important consideration among participants in forming
their overnight funding strategies.
Although not a new development, it is important to
consider that different types of securities can be pledged
as collateral for different purposes (and often at different
levels of collateralization). For example, when corporate
bonds are used as collateral, the lender typically requires
the borrower to pledge a greater amount of collateral
than if Government of Canada securities had been
pledged, reﬂecting the difference in credit quality.24
Furthermore, to safeguard the knowledge of its mar-
ket positions, a participant may be less willing to
pledge some types of collateral with competing partici-
pants. Collateral management is further complicated
by the fact that the exact magnitude of the funding
requirements of market participants is not known at
the commencement of trading, but evolves through-
out the day. Given the increased demand for collat-
eral, the importance of determining which collateral
to pledge for each different requirement has there-
fore increased, requiring participants to evaluate the
optimal use of their stock of collateral relative to their
needs.
Given the increased demand for
collateral, the importance of
determining which collateral to
pledge for each different requirement
has therefore increased, requiring
participants to evaluate the optimal
use of their stock of collateral relative
to their needs.
Examining the evolution of the types of collateral
pledged in the LVTS provides an understanding of the
growing importance of collateral management and its
impact on the behaviour of market participants. For
example, the range of securities that can be pledged in
the LVTS was expanded in 2001 in response to requests
from financial institutions to include (with certain
24. The additional collateral reﬂects the imposition of a”haircut” by ﬁnancial
participants. A haircut is the percentage by which an asset's market value is
reduced for the purpose of calculating the levels of capital requirements, mar-
gins, and collateral. Since the value is reduced for the purpose of calculating
collateral requirements, a greater amount of collateral is pledged than if no
haircut was applied.27 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2007
restrictions) BAs, promissory notes, commercial paper
and short-term municipal paper, and corporate and
municipal bonds.25 Of note, the use of the expanded
list of collateral has grown, from about 4 to 6 per
cent of the total collateral pledged in the LVTSwhen
the expanded list was ﬁrst introduced, to about 15 to
20 per cent today. This use probably reﬂects partici-
pants’ decision to redeploy Government of Canada
collateral to other uses, perhaps in the GC repo market.
The emergence of increasingly sophisticated investment
practices has also likely led to more dynamic collateral
management on the part of securities dealers. A hedge
fund, for example, by executing a large trade through
a dealer, may in turn force the dealer to enter the repo
market, which increases the complexity of the dealer’s
collateral management.26 In addition, to the extent
that commercial banks lend to select institutions, such
as hedge funds, the amount of the associated collateral
posted with the Bank will also fluctuate with the market
valueofthefund,andfrequentsubstitutionsofcollateral
may also be required as these funds alter their market
positions.
25.   See “Terms and Conditions for the Expanded Bank of Canada Collateral
List Effective 1 November 2001,” available on the Bank’s website at
www.bankofcanada.ca/en/notices_fmd/2001/not221001.html.
26.   An example might be the prevalence among investors to own a futures
contract while simultaneously selling short the underlying bond. This strat-
egy would in turn create a need to borrow this bond in the repo market,
putting downward pressure on the repo rate of the speciﬁc collateral. This
may partly explain the recent increase in the number of securities trading on
special in Canada.
The changing role of the repo market
While the repo market continues to be an important
market in which to ﬁnance securities inventories and to
raise and lend funds, it has become equally important
as a market in which to borrow and lend securities and,
therefore, to manage collateral. Correspondingly, the
repo market’s contribution to market efﬁciency contin-
ues to gain importance. Not only does it facilitate col-
lateral management, the repo market improves price
discovery in securities markets by facilitating short
sales, lowers trading frictions and settlement risk by
improving overall market liquidity, and improves port-
folio risk management.
Conclusion
The overnight market is a key component of the trans-
mission mechanism through which monetary policy
inﬂuences asset prices, aggregate demand, the output
gap, and eventually, inflation. Several important changes
have taken place since the late 1990s, including the
introduction of the LVTS and the FADs, and the growth
of securities lending. Overall, despite some volatility,
the overnight rate has shown much greater stability
than it did under the previous monetary policy frame-
work. These improvements have led to the growth and
increased efﬁciency of the Canadian money market
and contribute to the enhancement of liquidity in the
Canadian ﬁxed-income market more broadly.
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Within the framework for implementing monetary
policy, the Bank of Canada (the Bank) sets a target for
the overnight interest rate. This target is the first stage
in the transmission mechanism through which the
monetary policy actions taken bythe Bank affect the
level of economic activity and, ultimately, inﬂation.
The key features of this monetary policy implementa-
tion framework are the target for the overnight rate,
theoperatingband,theabilitytoconductbuy-sellback
and sell-buyback transactions at the target rate, and
the management of settlement balances.1 Given the
nature of this framework and the Canadian over-
night market, the Bank is best able to inﬂuence short-
term rates by targeting a level for the collateralized
overnight rate.
Target for the Overnight Rate
The Bank of Canada’s target for the overnight rate is
the rate on collateralized, market-based overnight
transactions.2 This is defined as the rate at which
major participants in the money market borrow and
lend funds fully secured by acceptable collateral for a
term of one business day. The Bank will use the rate
on overnight general collateral (overnight loans that
are secured by non-specific government securities,
referred to as the GC overnight rate) as its guide to
conditions in the overnight market, although this
information may, at times, need to be supplemented
by information on conditions in other sectors of the
overnight market.3 Implicit in this arrangement is
the possibility that, if collateralized funds trade at the
Bank’s target for the overnight rate, uncollateralized
funds may well trade at rates above the target.
1.    For further details, see “A Primer on the Implementation of Monetary
Policy in the LVTS Environment,” and “The Framework for the Implementa-
tion of Monetary Policy in the Large Value Transfer System Environment.”
Both are available on the Bank of Canada’s website at www.bankofcanada.ca/
en/monetary/lvts/index.html.
2. Previously, the target for the overnight rate had been broadly deﬁned as a
target for the rate at which major participants in the money market borrow
and lend one-day funds to each other.
3.   Such as times when there are relatively few GC trades observed.
Operating Band
The Bank’s target for the overnight rate is the midpoint
of a 50-basis-point band. The interest rate charged
for collateralized overdraft loans (advances) that are
made available through the Bank’s standing facilities
to members of the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS)
at final settlement is the upper limit of the operating
band, referred to as the Bank Rate. The interest rate
paid by the Bank on any positive balances held by
LVTS participants after ﬁnal settlement is set at the
lower limit of the operating band.
These arrangements encourage transactions for over-
night funds in the marketplace at rates inside of this
band, since participants are aware that they will earn
at least the Bank Rate less 50 basis points on positive
balances, and need not pay more than the Bank Rate
to cover negative balances. In addition, given that the
opportunity costs of borrowing from and lending to
the Bank at the end of the day are the same at the mid-




To reinforce the target for the overnight rate, the Bank
can intervene in the overnight market by conducting
buyback operations at the target rate, if required. If the
collateralized overnight rate is generally trading above
the target rate, the Bank will intervene with Special
Purchase and Resale Agreements (SPRAs), whereby
the Bank purchases government securities from primary
dealers4 with an agreement to resell those securities
the next business day, with the difference in price
equal to the value of interest for one business day paid
at the target for the overnight rate. Conversely, if
the collateralized overnight rate is generally trading
below target, the Bank will intervene with Sale and
Repurchase Agreements (SRAs), selling government
securities with an agreement to repurchase them on
the next business day, with the price difference equal
4. Primary dealers are a subgroup of government securities distributors that
have reached a threshold level of activity in the Government of Canada debt
markets.
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to one business day’s worth of interest calculated at
the target for the overnight rate.
These operations are typically conducted at 11:45,
encouraging market participants to trade with each
other during the morning, when a large proportion of
daily funding activity occurs. The Bank is prepared,
however, to enter into multiple rounds of open market
operations, if necessary, and to conduct those opera-
tions outside of the regular time, including earlier
in the morning, if warranted by conditions in the
overnight market.
Typically, the Bank neutralizes the cash impact on the
system of any SPRA or SRA operations. However, as
an additional tool to offset pressure on the overnight
rate, the Bank has the option of not fully neutralizing
the impact of open market operations. If some or all
SPRA or SRA operations are not neutralized, the sys-
tem could be left in a larger surplus or deﬁcit position
at the end of the day, requiring at least one LVTS
participant to leave funds on deposit at the Bank of
Canada at the Bank Rate less 50 basis points, or to
take advances at the Bank Rate.
Settlement Balances
Since the introduction of the LVTS, the level of settle-
ment balances in the system has typically been targeted
at zero or greater. Any participant in the LVTS with a
deﬁcit position is therefore aware that, typically, there
is at least one participant in the system with an offset-
ting surplus position who is a potential counterparty for
transactions at market rates.
Several adjustments have been made to the target
level of settlement balances since the inception of the
LVTS. Currently, the Bank will typically target a small
positive amount of settlement balances ($25 million),
thus alleviating transactions costs and other frictions
from the end-of-day process and reducing the need for
participants to take frequent small advances from the
Bank. The Bank retains the right, however, to adjust
the targeted level of settlement balances higher or
lower if warranted by conditions in the overnight
market.